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The Impact of University Patenting on Mobility of Scientists 
YE Xi 
 
Abstract 
After the passage of Bayh-Dole Act, universities have been actively involved in 
patenting. At the same time, the booming of university patenting has brought up 
huge controversies and debates in academia. A large body of literature is devoted, 
from a broad macro-level view, to investigate the impact of intellectual property 
rights (IPR) on the research activities of universities. However, very few empirical 
studies have been conducted to study the impact of university patenting on the 
mobility of individuals who have been granted these patents. This study, aiming to 
provide a different insight to the extant literature, employs data from U.S. 
Patenting and Trademark Office (USPTO) to empirically test the impact of 
university patenting activities on the decisions of scientists to choose between 
public and private sector. 
i 
 
Contents 
 
Acknowledgement .......................................................................................................... ii 
1.Introduction ................................................................................................................. 1 
2.Literature Review......................................................................................................... 3 
2. 1 Science ................................................................................................................. 3 
2. 2 The Emerge of University Patenting ..................................................................... 5 
2. 3 The Debates over University Patenting ................................................................. 8 
2.4 Academic Mobility as Knowledge Transfer ........................................................... 9 
3. Hypotheses ............................................................................................................... 14 
4. Data and Methodology .............................................................................................. 16 
4.1. Data ................................................................................................................... 16 
4.2. Methodology ...................................................................................................... 22 
4.3. Variables ............................................................................................................ 26 
5. Results and Analyses................................................................................................. 30 
6. Discussion and Conclusion ........................................................................................ 37 
References .................................................................................................................... 40 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ii 
 
Acknowledgement 
This thesis was researched and written during my two years master program in 
Singapore Management University. I am therefore much indebted not only to 
those professors who have assisted me in writing this thesis, but also those who 
have shown me kindness and wisdom with their inspiring and illuminating 
lectures in the past two years. Among these, I feel particularly grateful to 
Professor Kenneth HUANG and Professor Gokhan ERTUG, who were my thesis 
supervisors, for providing the initial data sets, giving me many constructive 
suggestions and patiently directing and correcting my thesis.  
I wish to thank Lee Kong Chian School of Business for giving me this opportunity 
to study in Singapore and also my classmates: Eileen, Alicia, Shreya, Ankit, Wang 
Cong and Jason for their kind help and support.     
Finally, my love and gratitude go to my beloved parents, WU Chunxia and YE 
Hongtao, who raised and supported me whole-heartedly in the past 25 years. Their 
meticulous love, constant encouragement and selfless sacrifice enable me to 
overcome all the hardships in life and inspire me to keep pursuing my dreams. I 
am devoting this thesis to them to express my gratefulness. 
0 
 
 
1 
 
1. Introduction 
After the Bayh-Dole Act, universities have assumed a greater role in patenting. 
Most universities have established Technology Transfer Offices (TTOs) to manage 
university intellectual property rights (IPR). The debates over the impact of 
university patenting on scientists are largely inconclusive. Scholars who surveyed 
academic scientists argue that patenting skews scientists’ research agendas toward 
commercial priorities, causes delay in the public dissemination of research 
findings, and crowds out effort devoted to producing public research (Blumenthal 
et al., 1996; Campbell et al. 2002; Krimsky, 2003). On the other side, several 
studies have come to an opposite conclusion by econometrically assessing the 
relationship between patenting and publishing and they reject the assertion that the 
increase of patenting in academia has come at the cost of diverting researchers’ 
time, interest, and attention from their traditional focus on standard scientific 
research (Agrawal and Henderson, 2002; Fabrizio and DiMinin, 2005; Azoulay et 
al., 2009).   
However, less attention has been given to empirically studying of the impact of 
university patenting on the mobility of scientists who are the creators and carriers 
of knowledge and skills.  There is scant research which has developed theoretical 
and econometric analyses of researchers between the public and private sector 
(Zucker et al., 2002; Crespi et al., 2007).   
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This paper, by adopting data from U.S. Patenting and Trademark Office (USPTO), 
aims to: (1) provide preliminary evidence on university patenting and career 
mobility for university scientists; (2) analyze the determinants of career mobility 
for university scientists after the granting of their first patents.  
 
Based on the data, we attempt to find out the determinants of scientists’ career 
mobility. Specifically, we would like to find out whether the early experience of 
scientists in either public sector or private sector will play an important role in 
determining their career path after their first patents are granted.  
 
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we present a brief review of the 
literature and related research of our study. Section 3 introduces the four 
hypotheses. Data and methodology are discussed in Section 4. Section 5 offers 
results and analyses. In Section 6 we provide the discussion and conclusion.  
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2. Literature Review 
2. 1 Science and Scientific Research   
2.1.1. Basic and Applied Research  
Science can be defined as research conducted with the aim to enhance human 
knowledge (Nelson, 1959). However, not all scientific research can be put into 
practical use immediately. For example, Adams (1990) has developed a series of 
industry measures of the stock of knowledge by looking at articles in academic 
journals and the employment of scientist in life science. He finds that it usually 
takes 20 to 30 years to transform a piece of knowledge into practical use.  
 
Therefore, research activities are categorized into basic and applied research. 
Basic research addresses the fundamental scientific interest while applied research 
has its focus on usefulness and applications (Stokes, 1986). Inevitably, basic 
research inherently has more uncertainties, not strictly pre-defined research 
objectives and longer time frame, while applied science is the opposite (Nelson, 
1959).  
 
However, the boundary between basic science and applied science is becoming 
blurred. Pasteur’s discovery of the value of the inoculation with weakened disease 
strains is one of the famous cases in point. While starting from applied end 
science, chicken cholera, Pasteur ended up with a major medical advance which is 
usually the task of basic science. Proposed by Donald Stokes in 1997, Pasteur’s 
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quadrant classifies scientific research into 4 categories by using two dimensions, 
quest for fundamental understanding and considerations of use (Donald Stokes, 
1997).  
Table 1 The Stokes Model 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Traditionally, due to the high uncertainties and risks, basic research is mainly 
sponsored by public sector while private sector actively participates in applied 
science research. The two sectors follow distinctive regimes — open science 
regime and private property rights regime, whereby different sets of economic 
incentive are adopted for cumulative knowledge production.  
 
2.1.2. The Open Science Regime      
Basic research falls into the Open Rights Regime, which encourages “free access” 
and “open science”. Merton proposed the concept of social institution of science 
in 1973. The priorities and reward system are argued as the pillars of the 
institution. The reward system of “Winner takes all” urges the scientists to 
disclose their discoveries to the public with no delay and invite peer-evaluations.  
Quest for 
Fundamental 
understanding? 
Yes 
Pure basic 
research 
(Bohr) 
Use-inspired  
basic research 
(Pasteur) 
No -- Pure applied  research (Edison) 
  
No Yes 
Considerations of use? 
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Building on this concept, the Open Science Regime includes the recognition of 
scientific priority by future scientific generations, the importance of demonstrating 
experimental replicability, and a system of public expenditure to reward those who 
contribute to cumulative knowledge production over the long term (Merton, 1973; 
Dasgupta and David, 1994).  
 
2.1.3. The Private Rights Regime  
In contrast to the Open Rights Regime, the Private Rights Regime aggressively 
protects its “private property rights” (Weitzman, 1974) through patenting, the right 
granted by the State to an inventor to exclude others from commercially exploiting 
the invention for a limited period (WIPO, 2004). In return for disclosure of the 
knowledge, patent owners receive a time-limited monopoly over their knowledge, 
which enables researchers to prevent others from using their knowledge or to 
insist that follow-on innovators secure a license and make a variety of payments, 
including royalty payments or fees (Huang and Murray, 2009)  
 
2. 2 The Emergence of University Patenting  
After World War II, the U.S. government began to strengthen its support in 
various basic researches through newly founded National Science Foundation. 
Until then, there have not been much patenting activities in universities partly due 
to issues surrounding the ownership and control of patents generated by federally 
funded research. In particular, universities had little ability to offer exclusive 
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licensing of government funded innovations (Issac and Park, 2009). This situation 
has greatly changed with the passage of Bayh-Dole Act in 1980.  
 
2.2.1. Bayh-Dole Act  
In order to fund basic research and facilitate private sector drawing on emerging 
knowledge, the Bayh-Dole Act, also known as the University and Small Business 
Patent Procedures Act came into place in 1980s. This act advocates business and 
universities to file for patents on the result of federally funded research and grant 
licenses for these patents, including exclusive licenses, to other parties. The Act 
facilitated university patenting and licensing in several ways. First, it replaced the 
negotiations between individual universities and federal agencies with a uniform 
policy. Second, the Act’s provisions represented a Congressional expression of 
support for the negotiation of exclusive licenses between universities and 
industrial firms for the results of federally funded research. Finally, it constituted a 
Congressional endorsement of the argument that failure to establish patent 
protection over the results of federally funded university research would limit the 
commercial exploitation of these results (Mowery et al., 2001). Since then, 
universities have largely expanded activities in patenting and the number of 
university patents has soared after 1980.  
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2.2.2. The Effect of Bayh-Dole Act  
Table 2 displays the large increase of university patenting since Bayh-Dole Act. 
The number of patents issued to US Universities between 1994 and 1997 is more 
than 10 times of the patents issued between 1969 and 1974. Trajtenberg et al. 
(1994) noted that the share of all US patents accounted for by universities grew 
from less than 1% in 1975 to almost 2.5% in 1990. Moreover, the increased 
patenting was dominated by growth in biomedical patents (Mowery et al. 2001).   
 
Table 2 Utility Patents Issued to US Universities and Colleges 
1969-1997 (year of issue) 
 
Year Number of US University Patents 
1969 188 
1974 249 
1979 264 
1984 551 
1989 1228 
1994 1780 
1997 2436 
                                 Source: United States Patent and Trademark Office (1998)  
 
The booming of university patenting also brought up huge controversies and 
debates among academic scholars. Concerns about how patenting affects the 
public stream of knowledge and scientists are found in many sectors of society 
(Heller, 2008).  
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2. 3 The Debates over University Patenting   
Scholars have concerned themselves about the impact of university patenting on 
research and also the scientists. However, the debates are largely inconclusive.  
 
Scholars who stand at one side have surveyed academic scientists to find that 
patenting skews scientists’ research agendas toward commercial priorities, causes 
delay in the public dissemination of research findings, and crowds out effort 
devoted to producing public research (Blumenthal et al., 1996; Campbell et al. 
2002; Krimsky, 2003). They have also found out that scientists tend to execute a 
control right to exclude others using that knowledge for the traditional purpose of 
cumulative knowledge production. Murray and Stern (2007) present the results 
based on a patent-paper matched dataset of 340 peer-reviewed scientific articles 
appearing between 1997 and 1999 in Nature Biotechnology which suggest that 
citations to a paper decrease when a patent related to the same research is granted. 
Huang and Murray (2009) conducted a large-scale and more comprehensive 
quantitative study of 1279 patent-paper pairs in the life sciences from 1988 to 
2005. They showed a decline in follow-on knowledge production and 
accumulation by tracing the number of times the paired publication were cited in 
future publications after the corresponding patent was granted. 
 
On the other side, several studies have come to an opposite conclusion by 
econometrically assessing the relationship between patenting and publishing. 
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Agrawal and Henderson (2002) estimated fixed-effect regressions of the effect of 
patenting in a 15-year panel of 236 scientists in two MIT departments. They found 
that patenting did not affect publishing rates. Fabrizio and DiMinin (2005) 
constructed a sample of 166 academic patenters that were matched to an 
equivalent number of non-patenting scientists. They found a statistically positive 
effect of researchers’ patent stocks on their publication counts. Azoulay et al. 
(2009) conducted a large scale research of 3,862 scientists and they also rejected 
the assertion that the increase in patenting in academia has come at the cost of 
diverting researchers’ time, interest and attention from their traditional focus on 
standard scientific research.  
 
While the results of the debates remain inconclusive, some scholars believe that 
university patenting allows a quicker and easier access to the discoveries from 
universities and it facilitates the knowledge transfer.  
 
2.4 Academic Mobility as Knowledge Transfer  
 
Knowledge can be tacit or codified. Tacit knowledge is subconsciously understood 
and applied, difficult to articulate, developed from direct experience and action, 
and usually shared through highly interactive conversation, story-telling and 
shared experience. Tacit knowledge is acquired experimentally and transferred by 
demonstration, by personal instruction and by the provision of expert services.  
Codified knowledge, in contrast, can be more precisely and formally articulated. 
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Therefore, although more abstract, it can be more easily documented, transferred 
or shared (Zack, 1999). 
 
Relevant articles on economics of R&D and technology transfer (Nelson 1990; 
Rosenberg, 1990) all pointed out the importance of tacit knowledge and the costly 
acquisition of the knowledge. 
 
State-of-the-art technologies are often tacit knowledge and this knowledge is 
generally built internally through experience. It is often embodied in individuals 
and cannot easily be transferred across firms. Even within an organization, tacit 
knowledge does not flow easily. Szulanski (1996) showed the major barriers to 
internal knowledge transfer was tacit knowledge like the recipient's lack of 
absorptive capacity, causal ambiguity, and an arduous relationship between the 
source and the recipient. Almeida et al. (2002) reported that multinationals 
outperform alliance or markets in terms of knowledge transfer. Further, they 
showed it was mainly due to the internal mechanisms employed by multinationals 
which facilitate the sharing of tacit knowledge. 
 
Only the mobility of individuals who possess the tacit knowledge can facilitate the 
knowledge transfer to large degree. The link between labor mobility and 
knowledge transfer dates back to Arrow’s (1962) seminal work on the public 
aspect of knowledge. He asserted that mobility of personnel among firms provides 
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a way of spreading information. Geroski (1995) argued that spillover occur when 
a researcher paid by one firm to generate new knowledge transfers to another firm 
without compensating his/her former employer for the full inventory of ideas to 
travel with her or him. 
 
Cockburn, Henderson and Stern (2004) proved that workers in R&D intensive firms 
will ask lower pay than their counterparts for getting access to valuable knowledge 
and resources in the hope for higher pay in future. Scientists in R&D intensive 
industry like biotech do have intellectual human capital (Zucker, Darby and Brewer, 
1998) that attracts organizations.  
 
Organizations would like to take valuable scientists for the possessed intellectual 
human capital. Almeida and Kogut (1999) showed that engineers with more 
influential patents are usually more mobile. They also found that recipient firms 
tend to cite their prior works by using patent citation data, which is partial evidence 
of knowledge transfer through individuals’ mobility. Song et al. (2003) reported that 
mobile scientists build upon ideas from their previous firm more often than other 
scientists.  
Even though the flow of people from organization to another is arguably key in 
process of knowledge transfer, the diffusion of knowledge across organizations 
(Roger, 1995), there are few empirical studies examining the inter-sectoral 
mobility of scientists who are the creators and carriers of knowledge and skills.   
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As one of the few studies adopting econometric analyses, Zucker and colleagues 
studied the mobility of star scientists between universities and firms in 
biotechnology industry. They modeled the probability of a star scientist to move 
away from academia, including both part-time involvement in collaboration with a 
company (“linked”), and “real” full-time move to new employment within a 
company (“affiliated”). They concluded that the time a star scientist remains in a 
university before moving to a firm is: decreased as the quality of the bio-scientist 
increases; decreased as the percentage of ties to scientists outside the bio-
scientist’s organization increases. Only the number of top quality universities in 
the local area, via interfering university moves, increases the time a star scientist 
remains in a university before moving to a firm. However, most of the conclusions 
in this paper are based on the combination of both “linked” and “affiliated” 
scientists. (Zucker et al., 2002).  
 
In the Europe case, Crespi et al. (2007) conducted the first quantitative research 
on the phenomenon of university inventors’ mobility in the EU countries till 2007. 
Using data from the PatVal-EU database, they investigated the mobility patterns of 
inventors who applied for one of 9000 European Patent Office (EPO) across six 
European countries. They suggested that hiring the inventor of a patent from 
academia gives the employer access to the tacit knowledge. Also, the cumulative 
knowledge of the inventor and the market value of the patents are important 
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factors in the recruitment decisions of the firms. They adopted multinomial 
models to show the presence of a strong individual life cycle effect on mobility. 
They also found out that inventors with more valuable patents, which embody 
more tacit knowledge, are more likely to go to private organizations and scientific 
productivity has no impact on the probability of moving. However, being aware of 
the small number of observations, the authors believed that further validations are 
necessary. 
  
While the importance of academic mobility is underscored by past literature, little 
is known about the inter-sectoral knowledge transfer (such as industry to 
academia and vice versa) of intellectual human capital. In this paper, we focus on 
the full-time mobility of the scientists, who changed employment after the 
granting of their first patents. It is different from other papers, notably Zucker et 
al., (2002), who researched under the broader group of university-industry 
collaborations. Due to the absence of adequate data, the full-time mobility is often 
overlooked in most of the literature. This paper attempts to fill in such a gap and 
intends to: (1) provide empirical evidence on university patenting and career 
mobility for university scientists; (2) analyze the determinants of career mobility 
for university scientists after the granting of their first patents.  
 
14 
 
3. Hypotheses 
The longer a scientist has worked in the university the more he will identify with 
the incentive system of “open” science (Dasgupta and David, 1994). Following the 
norm of “publish or perish”, a scientist who is determined to succeed in academia 
may actively seek opportunities to publish papers and spend time in accumulating 
skills and reputation needed. At the same time, he is more likely to identify himself 
as a guardian for open science and devoutly follows the rules of “Republic of 
Science” (Merton, 1973) thereby increasing his probability of staying in the 
university.   
 
Moreover, a job change from the university to the private sector involves skill 
adjustments. For example, a scientist in a corporate environment may find 
himself/herself involved in meeting and explaining ideas to managers or investors 
who have little relevant science background. In this situation, adjustment may 
appear easier for younger scientists with fewer years in the academic environment.  
 
From the private sector’s perspective, hiring a senior scientist from the university 
would incur a higher transaction cost which covers the compensation for the 
scientist to leave the current employment and also costs on adjusting skills for the 
scientist. Therefore, it is less likely for the senior scientist to leave the university.  
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In the first two hypotheses, we predict how the early experience of a scientist before 
his/her first patent was granted will influence his/her career path. Therefore we have:  
 
Hypothesis 1A: The more years spent in public sector before the granting of first 
patent, the less possibility for a scientist to move to private sector.  
 
Hypothesis 1B: The more years spent in private sector before the granting of first 
patent, the higher possibility for a scientist to move to private sector.  
 
We further look into more specific employment of the scientists in order to identify 
the determinants to retain scientists within the universities or bring scientists back 
from private sector to public sector. The early experience associated with the public 
sector will leave a profound impact in terms of shaping the mindset of scientists. 
They are more likely to embrace the idea of “free access” to the knowledge instead 
of aggressively protecting “private property rights” through patenting. As a result, 
the scientists are more likely to switch back to the public sector after they spend 
some time in the private sector. Therefore we have:  
 
Hypothesis 2A: The more years spent in the university, the higher possibility a 
scientist would continue to stay in the university if he/she is employed in the 
university during the granting of first patent.  
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Hypothesis 2B: The more years spent in the public sector, the higher possibility a 
scientist would switch back to public sector if he is employed in the private sector 
during the granting of first patent. 
 
4.  Data and Methodology 
4.1. Data  
Using the initial data set of 5809 genomics life scientists from Huang and Ertug 
(2011), I randomly select 600 genomics scientists (about 10% of the data pool) for 
the statistical analysis We chose genomics based on three reasons: Firstly, rich 
data can be accessible from GenBank, the United States Patent and Trademark 
Office and the National Center for Biotechnology Information. Moreover, 
genomics provides a unique setting where the public sector and private sector 
actively interact with each other through publications and patents. The research 
collaboration between public and private sector has been growing substantially. 
And the knowledge transfer between the two sectors is often accompanied by the 
scientists moving away from public sector to the private sector, or vice versa. At 
the same time, genomics is of great importance to health and welfare. It holds the 
promise of “individualized medicine” which may cure heart disease, cancer, 
schizophrenia and a host of other conditions. Furthermore, a better understanding 
of the genetic factors that influence the susceptibility to infectious diseases could 
have a mammoth impact on health in the developing countries. Genomics could 
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also help agricultural scientists develop better crops and livestock which may ease 
the increasingly severe global food crisis (Collions et al., 2003). Therefore, the 
genomics has been used by firms as the foundation for innovation for many 
applications, from medical and environmental to industrial and agricultural 
products (Huang and Murray, 2009). I describe the detailed data collection and 
cleaning procedure below.  
 
The career path of the 5809 genomics scientists were identified through a list of U.S. 
scientists whose patents were granted in the U.S. Patent Office (USPTO). We used 
both Google Scholar and MIT Web of Science to collect the publications and 
identify the locations of scientists. Based on the list of scientists who have ever filed 
genomics patents (Jensen and Murray, 2005), we use an algorithm to filter through 
the MIT Web of Science to extract papers published by the scientists. However, 
because the program is based on the initials of scientists instead of full names, it 
cannot differentiate different scientists very well if they have the same initials. For 
example, a scientist named “Yu Hongtao” has filed a patent according to the patent 
list. Instead of searching specifically “Yu Hongtao”, the program searches all the 
papers published under “Yu H”, which may include publications by other scientists 
like “Yu Hua”, “Yu Hong”, etc.    
 
An extensive manual selection and cross-checking  is implemented to ensure all 
the papers are published only by the scientist “Yu Hongtao” who has filed a patent 
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before.   
 
The research procedure is as follows:  
 
Figure 1   THE FLOW CHART OF RESEARCH PROCESS 
 
 
                                                             Step 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                            Step 2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Generally, there are two scenarios:  
1. Unique western names;  
2. Chinese or Japanese names.  
In this first case (authors with unique western names), we have identified and 
confirmed the address for most of the years. For example, “Zlotnik; Albert” whose 
Key in “Full name” in Google 
CV, biosketch, Linkedin 
Key in “Full name” in 
Google scholar 
Checking the publications year by 
year  
Obtain the full name and full 
address from the publications 
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initial is ZLOTNIK A and most years under this author are confirmed with only 
one address, like CONFIRMED | (DNAX RES INST, DEPT IMMUNOL, PALO 
ALTO, CA 94304 USA), or two addresses but in the same place, like 
CONFIRMED | ( DNAX RES INST, DEPT IMMUNOL, PALO ALTO, CA 94304 
USA ) ( DNAX RES INST, DEPT BIO, PALO ALTO, CA 94304 USA ). We 
believe the addresses are correct in this case. 
 
The second case is more complex thereby requiring more time and patience. For 
Chinese names or Japanese names, even with the same initials, there are many 
different names which indicate different scientists. For example, Yu;H can be Yu; 
Hong or Yu; Hongtao. So after the name of Yu;H, and for most of the years, even 
though they are confirmed, are with multiple addresses. 
 
 i.e. CONFIRMED | ( AMER HLTH FDN, 320 E 43 ST, NEW YORK, NY 10017 
USA ) ( AMER HLTH FDN, 320 E 43RD ST, NEW YORK, NY 10017 USA ) 
( SHANGHAI 2ND MED COLL, SHANGHAI, PEOPLES R CHINA ) ( UNIV 
WISCONSIN, DEPT CHEM, MADISON, WI 53706 USA ) 
 
 Following steps are adopted to delete all the wrong addresses and keep the right 
ones.  
  
STEP 1 Find the full name of the scientist. In this example, it is “Yu; Hongtao”.  
20 
 
 
STEP 2 Type the full name into the Google scholar search bar, with double 
quotation marks. Adjust the name order to make sure that the surname comes last. 
Again, in this case, “Hongtao Yu” is being put into the search. At this time, links 
such as below are available: 
 
 
STEP 3 Browse through the links to find the years which need to be checked. Full 
PDF pages are obtained and saved. 
 
  
STEP 4 Following the above procedure, we can confirm that the scientist named 
Hongtao Yu worked in Harvard in 1994. All the wrong addresses are therefore 
deleted and corrected addresses are kept.  
 
When the career path (in terms of organization affiliation) of a scientist is 
confirmed, we move to the next step to download all the publications of this 
scientist.  
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1) Go to ISI Web of Science Search Page 
2) Using the information in each cell in the spreadsheet assigned, search for: 
scientist’s name (e.g. Abraham D*) in Author (AU), AND Year Published 
(PY), AND Address (AD) 
3) Choose Timespan: All Years 
4) Choose only one Citation Database: Science Citation Index Expanded (SCI-
EXPANDED)--1899-present   
5) Press search 
6) Under Output Records, Step 1: choose Records 1 to XXX (maximum is 500 
per output). If the number of search exceeds 500, you would need to first 
download 1 to 500, and then go through this step again and download 501 to 
XXX and so on. 
7) Step 2: Choose “Full Record”, check plus Cited Reference 
8) Step 3: Save to Tab-delimited (Win)  
9) Press save.  
10) Name your file as Author name and publication entry number as downloaded 
(e.g. AbrahamD1-500.txt) 
11) After saving the file you can open in Excel. Subsequently, copy and paste and 
compile into 1 Excel file of publication for each Author 
Label the Excel file by the author name (e.g. AbrahamD.xls) 
 
As a result, data for a total of 5809 scientists are collected. As described above, we 
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then randomly select 600 scientists out of these 5809 scientists (10% of the data 
pool) for statistical analysis. 
 
4.2. Methodology  
4.2.1. Introduction to Event History Analysis and Survival Analysis  
Event history analysis is used to understand why certain individuals have a higher 
risk of experiencing certain events than other individuals and survival analysis 
helps researchers to analyze the timing of events.  
In event history analysis, researchers need to first understand the nature of event 
history. Take an event history analysis of marital histories as an example, the 
researchers need to sort out the four types of states in the marriage, which are 
“never married”, “married”, “divorced” and “widowed”. The term “event” in this 
case is a transition from one state to another.  
The risk period is another important concept in even history analysis. It is defined 
as the period that an individual is at risk of a particular event. Certain individuals 
may experience higher risk in a particular event. Using the above marriage 
example, a 40 year old individual who has never married has a higher “risk” of 
getting married. In this case, the period between now and the time when he gets 
married is the risk period.   
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The most typical type of event analyzed in survival analysis is that of death. 
Survival analysis can also be used to analyze other events as well, like 
unemployment, career mobility, etc. 
The survival time in survival analysis has two important features. Firstly, the 
survival time in survival analysis is never negative and is usually positively 
skewed. Furthermore, some subjects of survival time in survival analysis are not 
observed because the events of these particular subjects do not take place during 
the study period. The survival time, which is the object of study in survival 
analysis, should be differentiated from the calendar time. The survival time in 
survival analysis should always be measured related to some appropriate time 
origin. 
Survival analysis can be used to study many things, the cause of births and deaths, 
job changes and promotions, marriages and divorces, or the causes behind wars 
and revolutions, etc.  
4.2.2. Survival Function 
The object of primary interest is the survival function also called survivorship 
function, conventionally denoted S, which is defined as                                       
( ) Pr( )S t T t= >  
Where t is some time, T  is a random variable denoting the time of death, and  
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" Pr " stands for probability. Therefore, the survival function is the probability that 
the time of death is later than some specified time. The survival function is also 
called the survivor function or survivorship function in problems of biological 
survival problems.  
Usually it is assumed that (0) 1S = , although it could be less than 1 if there is the 
possibility of immediate death or failure. 
The survival function is a decreasing function where ( ) ( )S u S t£  if u t> . This 
property follows directly from ( ) 1 ( )F t S t= - being the integral of a non-negative 
function. This reflects the notion that survival at a later age is only possible if 
survival is achieved in all younger ages.  
The survival function is usually assumed to approach zero as age increases 
without bound, i.e., ( ) 0S t ®  as t ® ¥ , although the limit could be greater than 
zero if eternal life is possible.  
4.2.3. Cox Proportional Hazard Model  
The Cox proportional hazards model was introduced by David Cox, an English 
statistician, in his seminal paper “Regression Models and Life-tables” (DR Cox, 
1972). 
Typically, the survival analysis examines the relationship of the survival 
distribution to covariates. Most commonly, this examination entails the 
specification of a linear-like model for the log hazard (John Fox, 2002). For 
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example, a parametric model with exponential distribution may be written as  
  
1 1 2log ( )i i ik k ikh t x x xa b b b= + + + ××× +  
 Or as,  
 
1 1 2( ) exp( )i i ik k ikh t x x xa b b b= + + + ××× +  
In the above equations, i is a subscript for observation, and the x ’s are the 
covariates. The constant a in this model represents a kind of log-baseline hazard, 
since ( )ih t a= when all the x ’s are zero.  
The Cox model, on the contrary, leaves the baseline hazard function 
0( ) log ( )t h ta = unspecified:  
1 1 2log ( ) ( )i i ik k ikh t t x x xa b b b= + + + ×××+  
Or as,  
0 1 1 2( ) ( )exp( )i i ik k ikh t h t x x xa b b b= + + + ×× ×+  
This model is semi-parametric because the covariates in the model are linear. If 
we have two observations iand 'i with different x-values and following linear 
predictors 
1 1 2i i ik k ikx x xh b b b= + + ××× +  
and 
' 1 '1 2 ' 'i i i k k i kx x xh b b b= + + ××× +  
The hazard ratio for these two observations is independent of time t .  
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0
' 0
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
i i
i i
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i
h t h t e e
h t h t e e
h h
h h= =  
Therefore, the Cox model is a proportional hazard model.  
 
4.3. Variables 
Dependent Variable:  
1. Years of Moving: Years spent to make the first move after first patent of the 
scientist was granted. We captured the career period from 1983 to 2009. From 
the statistics summary, we can see that some scientists chose to move 
immediately after the grant of first patent while some chose not to move (the 
minimum is 1 and the maximum is 26). On average, it takes eight years for a 
scientist to make the first move after his/her first patent was granted.   
 
Explanatory Variables:   
1. Previous Company Experience: Years spent in companies when first patent 
of the scientist was granted. An average scientist has two years company 
experience when first patent was granted.  
 
2. Previous University Experience: Years spent in universities when first 
patent of the scientist was granted. On average, a scientist has seven years 
experience in university before his/her first patent was granted.  
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3. Previous Public Experience: Years spent in the public sector which 
includes universities, institutes and hospitals when first patent of the 
scientist was granted. An average scientist has almost 12 years experience 
in public sector before his/her first patent was granted. Some scientists 
have never stayed in the private sector (the maximum is 26).  
 
4. Past Patent Applications: Number of patent applications listed by the 
scientist when first patent of the scientist was granted. On average, a 
scientist has three patent applications before his/her first patent was 
granted while some productive scientists have 96 applications in their 
hands.  
 
 
5. University Reputation: A dummy variable with value 1 if the scientist was 
employed in that year by a university which was in the top university list 
of Gourman Report or US News.  
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Table 3 Key Variable Definitions 
Name Definition 
Years of Moving  Years spent to make the first move after first patent 
of the scientist was granted  
Previous Company 
Experience 
Years spent in companies when first patent of the 
scientist was granted 
Previous University 
Experience 
Years spent in universities when first patent of the 
scientist was granted 
Previous Public Experience Years spent in public sector which includes 
universities, institutions and hospitals when first 
patent of the scientist was granted. 
Past Patent Applications Number of patent applications listed by the 
scientist when first patent of the scientist was 
granted 
University Reputation A dummy variable with value 1 if the scientist was 
employed in that year by a university which was in 
the top university list of Gourman Report or US 
News 
 
Table 4 presents the descriptive statistics. Note that the number of observations for 
the research drops to 340 scientists due to the missing values. Among the 340 
scientists, 42.4% of them eventually chose to move after the granting of their first 
patents. 
Table 4 Summary Statistics of Key Variables  
 Full 
Sample  
Missing 
Value 
Non 
Mobile  
Mobile   
Number of Observations  600 260 196 144  
Variables N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Years of Moving  340 8 5.58 1 26 
Previous University Experience  340 7.26 7.66 0 26 
Previous Company Experience  340 2.09 4.12 0 24 
Previous Public Experience  340 11.90 9.69 0 26 
Past Patent Applications   340 3.8 7.02 1 96 
 
Among these 340 scientists, 144 scientists chose to move after their first patents 
were granted. As can be seen in Table 5, 24.31% of them chose to leave the 
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current employment within a year upon the granting of first patents. 21.53% made 
a career move within two years. More than half of the scientists who have moved 
chose to change the employment within three years after their first patents were 
granted. It gives an interesting insight for organizations wishing to retain the 
talents. The organizations should be extremely careful dealing with their favorite 
scientists for the first three years after their first patents are granted.                 
 
Table 5 Frequency for the Years of Moving 
Years of Moving  Frequency  Percentage 
1 35 24.31% 
2 31 21.53% 
3 16 11.11% 
4 15 10.42% 
5 13 9.03% 
6 10 6.94% 
7 8 5.56% 
8 3 2.08% 
10 6 4.17% 
11 1 0.69% 
12 3 2.08% 
16 1 0.69% 
19 1 0.69% 
25 1 0.69% 
In Total 144 100% 
 
Table 6 Correlation Matrix 
Explanatory Variables 1 2 3 
1. Previous University Experience    
2. Previous Company Experience -0.15   
3. University Reputation  0.03 -0.15  
4. Past Patent Applications -0.06 0.11 0.07 
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5. Results and Analyses 
For Hypothesis 1A and 1B, we would like to predict the possibility of the scientist 
moving to private sector since a high percentage of scientists would change their 
employment after the granting of their first patents. We use previous company 
experience and previous public experience to predict the likelihood of a scientist 
moving to private sector after his/her first patent was granted. We believe the early 
experience in the public sector or private sector is very important for a scientist 
since two sectors adopt distinctive incentive systems. The past patent applications is 
included as a control variable which reflects the openness of a scientist towards the 
privatization of knowledge.  
 
 
Table 7 Statistical Results for Hypothesis 1A and 1B 
 
          Variable   Cox Proportional Hazard Model  
Dependent Variable   
Years of Moving to Private Sector   
Independent Variable  
Previous Company Experience 0.052*** 
(0.02) 
Previous Public Experience -0.088*** 
(0.02) 
Control Variables  
Past Patent Applications 0.034*** 
(0.01) 
 
Table 7 presents the results of our tests of Hypothesis 1A and Hypothesis 1B. As 
can be seen, both hypotheses are significantly supported. If a scientist has spent 
more years in the public sector before his/her first patent was granted, it is less 
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likely that he/she would move to the private sector after the grant. However, if a 
scientist has spent more time in the private sector when his/her patent was granted, 
we can expect a higher probability of a move to private sector after the grant. 
From the result, one more year of experience in the public sector will decrease the 
hazard of moving to the private sector by 8.4% (1- exp(-0.088)=1-0.916=0.084). 
At the same time, one year increase in the private sector will yield a higher hazard 
of 5.3% in moving to the private sector for the scientist (exp(0.052)-1=1.053-
1=0.053).  
 
Since first patent of the scientist was granted, the scientist was “at risk” of moving 
to the private sector. From Figure 2 and Figure 3, we can intuitively see that 
scientists with early experience in the public sector would have a better “survival 
rate” from moving to the private sector. However, scientists with previous 
company experience have lower “survival rate”. Therefore these scientists more 
likely will move to the private sector. 
Figure 2 Survival Estimate for Hypothesis 1A 
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Figure 3 Survival Estimate for Hypothesis 1B 
 
 
 
For Hypothesis 2A, previous university experience is the independent variable 
with previous company experience, university reputation and past patent 
applications as control variables. As can be seen in Table 8, there is a strong 
support for Hypothesis 2A (p<0.05). Scientists who have worked many years in 
academia tend to continue staying in academia even after the granting of first 
patents. It echoes with the research results from Crespi et al. (2007), who also 
found out that more years of tenure in the university lower a scientist’s probability 
of moving. Two reasons can explain this result. Firstly, the number of years spent 
in the academia demonstrates the compatibility of a scientist with the academia 
environment. The longer the scientist has worked within one particular university, 
the more he/she will identify with the incentive system and routines in that 
university, and less willing he/she will have to move. Furthermore, a scientist’s 
skills gradually become university specific and he/she tends to demand a higher 
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salary with more experience in the university, which eventually reduce the 
opportunity of moving out. With one more year of experience in university before 
first patent was granted, a scientist has 3.3% more likelihood to stay in university 
(exp (0.032)-1=1.033-1=0.033) or a 3.3% lower likelihood of moving to the 
private sector. Contrary to the expectations, university reputation does not have an 
impact on scientist’s mobility decision of leaving the academia after his/her first 
patent was granted.  
 
Table 8 Statistical Results for Hypothesis 2A  
 
            Variable  Cox Proportional Hazard Model  
Dependent Variable  
Years of Moving from University  
Independent Variable  
Previous University Experience -0.032** 
(0.02) 
Control Variables  
Previous Company Experience  0.015 
(0.03) 
University Reputation  0.106 
(0.23) 
Past Patent Applications 0.010 
(0.01) 
  
Number of Observations 166 
Log-likelihood -374.7 
Chi2 6.37 
 
Figure 4 displays the “survive rate” of a scientist from moving away from the 
university. It can be observed that a scientist with previous university experience 
has a higher survival rate therefore he is more likely to stay in the university.  
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Figure 4 Survival Estimate for Hypothesis 2A 
 
 
In Hypothesis 2B, we use a scientist’s previous public experience as the 
independent variable to predict his/her probability of moving back to public sector 
if he/she was employed in the private sector during the granting of first patent. As 
the same time, we control for the previous company experience and also past 
patent applications of the scientists.  
 
The results in Table 9 support our last hypothesis that a scientist with previous 
experience in the public sector has better chance to move back to public sector 
while whether he/she has applied patents before has no influence on the decision 
of moving back to public sector. In fact, with one more year experience in public 
sector, a scientist is 20.4% more likely to switch back to public sector if he is 
employed by private sector during the granting of his first patent. Figure 5 
confirms that a scientist with previous public experience is more willing to move 
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back to public sector from private sector.   
 
Table 9 Statistical Results for Hypothesis 2B 
Variable Cox Proportional Hazard Model 
Dependent Variable  
Years of Moving to Public Sector  
Independent Variable  
Previous Public Experience 0.186*** 
(0.03) 
Control Variables  
Previous Company Experience 0.078 
(0.04) 
Past Patent Applications -0.022 
(0.03) 
  
Number of Observations 97 
Log-likelihood -82.4 
Chi2 25.68 
 
 
Figure 5 Survival Estimate for Hypothesis 2B 
 
 
 
The first two hypotheses focus on predicting the future career movement of a 
scientist. A scientist’s previous company experience, previous university 
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experience and past patent applications before the granting of first patent can be 
used to predict the his/her future employment. Hypothesis 2A and Hypothesis 2B 
address the concerns of retaining scientists within the public sector. If a scientist is 
currently employed in the academia, his/her previous university experience would 
increase the chance for him/her to continue staying in the academia. At the same 
time, the reputation of the scientist’s university has no impact on his/her decision 
of moving. However, if a scientist is working in the private sector, his/her 
previous public experience will increase his/her possibility of moving back to 
public sector. We do not find any significant result for the control variables: 
previous company experience and past patent applications.  
 
From the results, we can see that past experience upon the granting of the first 
patent would play an important role in predicting scientists’ career path. If a 
scientist is employed in the university, the number of years in university before the 
granting of first patent would increase his/her probability to continue staying in 
the university. If a scientist is employed in the company, the more years he/she 
spent in the public sector before the granting of first patent, the higher chance 
he/she will switch back to the public sector. Generally speaking, regardless which 
employment a scientist is with during the granting of first patent, the number of 
years in public or private sector will ultimately impact a scientist’s career direction.   
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6. Discussion and Conclusion 
In this paper, we have randomly sampled 600 scientists, which accounts for 10% 
of the total life scientists who have ever been granted a genomics patent. After 
excluding missing values, 340 observations were eventually obtained for the 
research. Four types of employment for the scientists were classified: university, 
research institute, hospital and company. Among these four types of employment, 
university, research institute and hospital fall under the public domain while 
company belongs to the private domain. We notice that the majority of the 
scientists (57.6%) chose to stay in the same place after their first patents were 
granted. Still, 42.4% of the total 340 observation changed their employment after 
the granting of first patents. Interestingly, one in four scientists chose to move 
within a year after the first patent was granted and more than half of them have 
changed their employment within three years after their first patents were granted.  
 
We believe the early experience of a scientist in either public or private sector will 
play an important role in determining his/her career path since two sectors adopt 
very different incentive systems: the public sector encourages “free access” and 
the private sector aggressively protects its “private property rights” (Weitzman, 
1974) through patenting. We argue that the longer a scientist has worked in the 
universities the more he/she will identify with the incentive system of “open” 
science (Dasgupta and David, 1994). The rule of “publish or perish” forces a 
scientist who is determined to succeed in academia to actively seek opportunities 
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to publish papers and his/her skills are honed to survive in the university 
environment. Meanwhile, a scientist’s skills gradually become university specific 
and he/she tends to demand a higher salary with more experience in universities.  
As a result, he/she is less likely to leave universities. At the same time, a scientist 
who spent his/her early years in the private sector may not fully appreciate or 
grasp the essence of these rules in academia. Therefore the scientist tends to 
choose private sector as the employment over time.   
 
Event history analysis, specifically Cox Proportional Hazard Model is used in this 
paper. After the granting of first patent, a scientist is exposed to the “risk” of 
moving away from the current employment. Once the scientist moves, we refer it 
as a “failure”.  
 
Four hypotheses in this paper were significantly supported, providing evidence 
that the past experience upon the granting of first patent indeed plays an important 
role in predicting a scientist’s career path:  
 
1) The more years spent in public sector, the less likely a scientist would 
move to private sector after his/her first patent is granted while the 
more years spent in private sector, the more likely a scientist would 
move to private sector after his/her patent is granted. At the same time, 
more patent applications would increase a scientist’s probability to 
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move to private sector.  
  
2)  For a scientist who is employed in the university when his/her first 
patent is granted, the previous experience in universities would 
increase his/her propensity towards staying in universities.  
 
 
3) If a scientist is employed in the private sector during the granting of 
first patent, the past experience in public sector would motivate 
him/her to move back to public sector.  
 
This work has several limitations. Firstly, this paper focuses on life scientists, 
particularly genomics scientists. Therefore we should be cautious about 
generalizing it to other disciplines in predicting scientists’ career path after their 
first patents have been granted. Nevertheless, to the extent that academic scientists 
are driven by similar incentives to publish and increasingly to patent, we may be 
able to extend the insights from this study to other fields. Future studies could use 
similar approach to investigate the generalizability of our findings in other 
scientific fields. Moreover, in order to develop a better and broader understanding 
of the process of knowledge exchange between science and industry, more 
explanatory variables and additional controls could to be included.  
 
While the study could benefit from further validation, it provides some interesting 
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insights for both scientists and organizations. For a scientist, he/she should 
consider the possibilities of changing employment carefully during the first three 
years after his/her first patent is granted. On the contrary, the organizations should 
be extremely careful in treating their valuable scientists during the first three years 
after their first patents are granted. Also, if a company wants to attract scientists 
from the public sector, it is always useful to check their prior company experience. 
Scientists with more years of prior experience in the private sector will be more 
likely to accept the invitation from a company.   
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